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Sysmon Event IDs 1, 6, 7 Report All the Binary Code Executing on Your Network

Mon, 18 Dec 2017 17:20:06 GMT

Computers do what they are told whether good or bad. One of the best ways to detect intrusions is to recognize when computers are following bad instructions – whether in binary form or in some higher-level scripting language. We’ll talk about scripting in the future but in this article, I want to focus on monitoring execution of binaries in the form of EXEs, DLLs and device drivers.

The Windows Security Log isn’t very strong in this area. Event ID 4688 tells you when a process is started and provides the name of the EXE – in current versions of Windows you thankfully get the full path – in older versions you only got the file name itself. But even full pathname isn’t enough. This is because that’s just the name of the file; the name doesn’t say anything about the contents of the file. And that’s what matters because when we see that c:\windows\notepad.exe ran how do we know if that was really the innocent notepad.exe that comes from Microsoft? It could be a completely different program altogether replaced by an intruder, or more in more sophisticated attacks, a modified version of notepad.exe that looks and behaves like notepad but also executes other malicious code.

Instead of just the name of the file we really need a hash of its contents. A hash is a relatively short, finite length mathematical digest of the bit stream of the file. Change one or more bits of the file and you get a different hash. (Alert readers will recognize that couldn’t really be true always – but in terms of probabilistic certainty it’s more than good enough to be considered true.)

Unfortunately, the Security Log doesn’t record the hash of EXEs in Event ID 4688, and even if it did, that would only catch EXEs – what about DLLs and device drivers? The internal security teams at Microsoft recognized this need gap as well as some which apparently led to Mark Russinovich, et al, to write Sysmon. Sysmon is a small and efficient program you install on all endpoints which generates a number of important security events “missing” from the Windows Security Log. In particular, sysmon logs:

  • Event Id 1 - for process creation (i.e. an EXE was started)
  • Event Id 6 – driver loaded
  • Event Id 7 – imaged loaded (i.e. an DLL was loaded)

Together these 3 events created a complete audit record of every binary file loaded (and likely executed) on a system where sysmon is installed.

But, in addition to covering DLLs and drivers, these events also provide the hash of the file contents at the time it was loaded. For instance, the event below shows that Chrome.exe was executed and tells us that the SHA 256-bit hash was 6055A20CF7EC81843310AD37700FF67B2CF8CDE3DCE68D54BA42934177C10B57.

   Process Create:

   UtcTime: 2017-04-28 22:08:22.025

   ProcessGuid: {a23eae89-bd56-5903-0000-0010e9d95e00}

   ProcessId: 6228

   Image: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe

   CommandLine: "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=utility --lang=en-US --no-sandbox --service-   request-channel-token=F47498BBA884E523FA93E623C4569B94 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=3432 /prefetch:8

   CurrentDirectory: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\58.0.3029.81\

   User: LAB\rsmith

   LogonGuid: {a23eae89-b357-5903-0000-002005eb0700}

   LogonId: 0x7EB05

   TerminalSessionId: 1

   IntegrityLevel: Medium

   Hashes: SHA256=6055A20CF7EC81843310AD37700FF67B2CF8CDE3DCE68D54BA42934177C10B57

   ParentProcessGuid: {a23eae89-bd28-5903-0000-00102f345d00}

   ParentProcessId: 13220

   ParentImage: C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe

   ParentCommandLine: "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe"

Now, assuming we have the ability to analyze and remember hashes, we can detect whenever a new binary runs on our network.

Sysmon allows you to create include and exclude rules to control which binaries are logged and which hashes are computed based on an xml configuration file you supply sysmon at installation time or any time after with the /c command. Sysmon is easy to install remotely using Scheduled Tasks in Group Policy’s Preferences section. In our environment we store our sysmon.xml file centrally and have our systems periodically reapply that configuration file in case it changes. Of course, be sure to carefully control permissions where you store that configuration file.

Just because you see a new hash – doesn’t necessarily mean that you’ve been hacked. Windows systems are constantly updated with Microsoft and 3rd party patches. One of the best ways to distinguish between legitimate patches and malicious file replacements is if you can regularly whitelist known programs from a systems patched early – such as patch testing systems.

Once sysmon is installed you need to collect the Sysmon event log from each endpoint and then analyze those events – detecting new software. EventTracker is a great technology for accomplishing both of these tasks.


This article by Randy Smith was originally published by EventTracker

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